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Benefit-cost analysis (BCA) is often viewed as measuring the efficiency of a policy independent of the 
distribution of its consequences. The role of distributional effects on policy choice is disputed; either: (a) 
the policy that maximize net benefits should be selected and distributional concerns should be 
addressed through other measures, such as tax and transfer programs, or (b) BCA should be 
supplemented with distributional analysis and decision makers should weigh efficiency and distribution 
in policy choice. The separation of efficiency and distribution is misleading. The measure of efficiency 
depends on the numéraire chosen for the analysis, whether monetary values or some other good 
(unless individuals have the same rates of substitution between them). The choice of numéraire is not 
neutral; it can affect the ranking of policies by calculated net benefits. Alternative evaluation methods, 
such as BCA using a different numéraire, weighted BCA, or a social welfare function, may better 
integrate concerns about distribution and efficiency. The most appropriate numéraire, distributional 
weights, or social welfare function cannot be measured or statistically estimated; it is a normative 
choice. 
 








Recent years have witnessed growing inequality of income within many countries. Concern about 
inequality has also increased, as reflected in political movements such as “Occupy Wall Street” in the 
United States and the “gilets jaunes” (“yellow vests”) in France and in the popularity of Thomas Piketty’s 
2013 study of the rise of inequality in Europe and the United States over 250 years.1  
Benefit-cost analysis (BCA), as usually practiced, sums monetary values of policy effects across 
individuals. It does not account for how benefits and costs are distributed in a population and may not 
incorporate social concerns about inequality. The underlying notion is to distinguish between efficiency 
(producing the greatest possible benefit from available resources) and equity (fair or appropriate 
distribution of benefits and costs). BCA is often described as evaluating only efficiency, what Posner 
(1979) describes as “wealth maximization.” Textbooks and guidance documents recognize that both 
efficiency and equity are important to policy choice and often recommend that BCA be supplemented 
by analysis of the distribution of effects, leaving it to decision makers to determine how to integrate 
concerns about efficiency and equity (e.g., OMB 2003, European Commission 2015, HM Treasury 2018, 
Zerbe et al. 2013, Robinson et al. 2016). An alternative perspective is that policies should be chosen on 
the basis of maximizing net benefits using tax and transfer programs to offset any undesired 
distributional effects (Mishan 1969, Harberger 1978, 1980, Kaplow 1996, 2004). I will use the term 
“equal-weight BCA” to describe the type of BCA in which monetary values of benefits and harms are 
added across individuals, with the implication that distributional effects can be considered separately. 
The analytic distinction between efficiency and equity is imperfect because the measure of efficiency 
depends on the numéraire, the good in which benefits and costs are measured. When individuals’ rates 
of substitution between potential numéraires differ, the relative efficiency of different policies can be 
affected by the choice among them. It is often stated that although BCA uses monetary values of wealth 
or income as the numéraire, the analysis could be conducted using other goods instead. This is true, but 
it is less widely recognized that changing the numéraire can affect the ranking of alternative policies. 
Other interpretations of BCA are sensitive to distributional effects (Florio 2014). Drèze and Stern (1987) 
define BCA as summing individually weighted net benefits as a method to evaluate the change in a 
 
1 Although income inequality has increased within many countries, global income inequality has declined 





specified social welfare function; Weisbrod (1968) advocates a similar approach. Johansson (1998) 
describes summing unweighted net benefits as “a very unusual interpretation of the meaning of a social 
cost-benefit analysis” (p. 490).  
Distributional effects can be incorporated using weighted BCA (Drèze and Stern 1987, Adler 2016, 
Fleurbaey and Abi-Rafeh 2016) or a social welfare function (Adler 2019). A social welfare function (SWF) 
ranks distributions of wellbeing in a society and can incorporate preferences for both efficiency and 
distribution. In contrast to BCA, it requires a method for evaluating individuals’ wellbeing that allows for 
interpersonal comparisons, i.e., the ability to determine whether the effects of a policy on one person 
provides a larger, smaller, or equal change in wellbeing as the (possibly different) effects of that policy 
on another person. Weighted BCA multiplies individuals’ net benefits by a distributional or welfare 
weight before summing; the calculated net social benefits are more sensitive to effects on individuals 
with larger weights. Weighted BCA can approximate the effects of using an SWF or an alternative 
numéraire, at least for policies having small effects on individuals.  
Concerns about distributional equity may pertain to distribution across multiple dimensions. Often, the 
concern is about differences in income or wealth, but the interests of many diverse groups are raised in 
policy making.2 The United States has regulatory guidance requiring special attention to health effects 
on children, minority, and low-income populations (Robinson et al. 2016). Distribution of effects across 
geographic regions or political jurisdictions is also a frequent concern. 
The remainder of this paper elaborates on these issues. Section 2 describes the conceptual basis for 
equal-weight BCA and illustrates how the evaluation of efficiency can depend on the choice of 
numéraire. It also illustrates the equivalence between the choice of numéraire and the choice of weights 
used in weighted BCA. Section 3 introduces social welfare functions. It describes an important 
complexity that arises when the effects of a policy are uncertain: the results can depend on whether 
policy effects are evaluated ex ante (when each individual faces a probability distribution over 
consequences) or ex post (when the possible population distributions of consequences are evaluated 
 
2 Graham (2008) reports that in his role overseeing evaluation of U.S. regulations, outside groups 
pressed the interests of farmers, small business owners, women, racial and ethnic minorities, workers, 
senior citizens, children, disabled individuals, people with chronic illnesses, uninsured individuals, 
migrants (legal and illegal), people who lack English proficiency, labor unions, consumer advocates, 
public health associations, medical providers, manufacturers, electric utilities, title insurers, bankers, 





and weighted by their respective probabilities). The same issue arises with BCA but receives little 
attention. Section 4 considers issues associated with describing the distributions of benefits, costs, and 
net benefits across individuals. The equity of a policy presumably depends on the distribution of net 
benefits; it seems implausible that one can determine whether a particular distribution of benefits is 
equitable without knowing how the costs are allocated. This raises methodological challenges: equal-
weight BCA can proceed by estimating aggregate benefits and aggregate costs in the population without 
inquiring into their distribution. Determining the distribution of net benefits requires estimating not only 
the marginal distributions of benefits and costs in the population but also their joint distribution 
(alternatively, the marginal distribution of net benefits). For many policy consequences, estimating even 
the marginal distributions of benefits or costs, much less the joint distribution, may be exceedingly 
difficult. Section 5 presents conclusions. 
2. Equal-weight benefit-cost analysis 
An individual’s wellbeing depends (in part) on the levels of goods and services she consumes. The 
individual determines some of these levels by her market behavior, e.g., as a buyer of goods and a seller 
of labor. The levels of other consumption, such as ambient air quality, are determined by her 
environment and public policies.3 Conventional economics assumes that each individual has a complete 
and transitive preference ordering over possible consumption bundles. It is commonly assumed that this 
preference ordering aligns with her self-assessed wellbeing, i.e., that she prefers bundles that yield 
greater wellbeing. Clearly this is not always true, e.g., when the individual is misinformed about the 
effects of consuming certain products or is unable to limit her consumption because of addiction. 
A central problem of social choice arises from the fact that public policies cannot precisely differentiate 
their effects across individuals. While some targeting is possible with respect to income, residential 
location, and many other factors, public policies generally impose similar effects on broad classes of 
individuals (e.g., ambient air quality is the same for everyone in a location). In the event that everyone 
prefers their situation with a policy to their situation without, the policy is Pareto superior to the status 
quo and is widely regarded as desirable.4 But when some people prefer their situations with the policy 
and others prefer their situations with the status quo or an alternative policy, any policy choice requires 
 
3 Individuals have some control over their environment, e.g., through choice of residence and 
workplace. 
4 A Pareto improvement might be regarded as undesirable if it provides large gains to people who are 





reducing the wellbeing of some people (compared with some alternative choice) to enhance the 
wellbeing of others. This raises a central problem of social choice: when it is justified to harm some 
people to help others?  
Conventional economics operates under the assumption that there is no objective method for 
comparing levels or changes in wellbeing between individuals. To compare gains and losses among 
people requires choosing a standard for comparison. This contrasts with the classic utilitarian calculus in 
which it is assumed one can compare changes in wellbeing between people and determine whether the 
total gains exceed the total harms.  
Equal-weight BCA uses monetary values as the standard for comparing benefits and harms across 
individuals. Assuming the effects of a policy on each individual can be measured as a person-specific 
monetary value,5 the sum of these values determines whether the policy plus a set of monetary 
compensation payments is Pareto superior to the status quo. If the sum is positive, the policy is said to 
satisfy the Kaldor-Hicks compensation test and to provide a potential Pareto improvement: in principle, 
money could be transferred from some of those who are helped by the policy and paid to those who are 
harmed in such a way that every individual would prefer the policy plus transfer (paid or received) to the 
status quo. The policy provides a potential Pareto improvement because the outcome with the policy 
could be transformed by a set of transfer payments into a Pareto improvement on the status quo. The 
transfer payments are of course hypothetical and it is assumed they could be made as lump-sum 
transfers, i.e., with no administrative costs and no effects on individuals’ behavior (such as labor supply).  
Equal-weight BCA may be justified on the grounds that (a) it provides an adequate and practical 
approximation to a desired utilitarian calculus, (b) if used over many policy choices, the individuals who 
gain or lose will differ and in total everyone will gain (relative to some alternative decision rule that is 
usually left unspecified), and (c) it maximizes the total goods and services available to the economy, and 
unwanted distributional effects can be ameliorated at lower cost by transfer programs than by altering 
policy choices. The first justification is arguable and depends on the definition of adequate 
approximation. The second depends on the alternative decision rule with which BCA is compared; BCA 
has the advantage of incorporating the preferences of everyone affected by the policy but by measuring 
 
5 I set aside the difference between compensating and equivalent surplus measures and the difference 
between testing whether policy winners could compensate policy losers for the harm they suffer and 
whether policy losers could compensate policy winners for the harm they would suffer by forgoing the 





values in monetary units tends to give greater weight to the preferences of wealthier individuals (in 
principle; in practice BCA often uses common values for everyone in a population). The third justification 
is misleading because the total of goods and services depends on how they are measured, i.e., the 
choice of numéraire. 
The case for choosing policies by the sum of unweighted net benefits and using income-sensitive taxes 
and transfers (“taxes” for short) to offset any unwanted distributional effects merits further discussion. 
Harberger (1978, 1980) argues that the relative weights on individuals’ benefits or costs that might be 
associated with distributional fairness would in general differ by much more than the costs of 
redistributing income through changes in taxes. Since the calculated benefit of any policy effect should 
not exceed the least-cost method of achieving it, distributional effects should be valued not by using 
distributional weights but by using the cost of redistribution through a modified tax schedule.  
Hylland and Zeckhauser (1979) and Kaplow (1996, 2004) also advocate separating efficiency from 
distributional goals. When distributional concerns are limited to how policy effects are distributed by 
income, these authors employ the concept of a distribution-neutral tax change, i.e., a (positive or 
negative) change in taxes by income class that would make everyone indifferent between the policy 
with tax changes and forgoing the policy. If the policy does not affect the labor-leisure tradeoff (as for 
example a policy that improves recreational opportunities might, by inducing people to work less), labor 
supply and incomes are unaffected. The net change in government revenue is equal to the sum of 
unweighted net benefits by construction. Hence taxes can be decreased at all income levels making the 
policy plus taxes a Pareto improvement if and only if the sum of individuals’ net benefits is positive. The 
general point is any policy can be divided into distributional and non-distributional components and it is 
valuable to evaluate the components independently; the construct of a distribution-neutral tax change 
permits direct comparison of the non-distributional effects of different policies. A limitation of the 
Harberger, Hylland and Zeckhauser, and Kaplow results is that changes in taxes cannot account for 
differences in policy consequences among people having the same income and other characteristics by 
which taxes can be differentiated. 
It is often stated that monetary values are used for convenience and that other commodities could be 
used as the numéraire or standard for interpersonal comparison of changes in wellbeing. This is true, 
but the fact that the choice of numéraire can alter the ranking of policies is less well recognized. When 
individuals have different rates of substitution between commodities that are used as alternative 





equity is not fixed but depends on the choice of numéraire.6 In an Arrow-Debreu economy with 
complete markets, marginal rates of substitution between all goods would be equal to their price ratios 
and the choice of numéraire would have no effect on the evaluation. Differences in rates of substitution 
arise from missing markets and limited ability to trade some goods, such as health. In principle, any of a 
wide range of goods could be used as numéraire; perhaps the only restriction is the numéraire should be 
a good for which an increased quantity is always preferred (i.e., the assumption of non-satiation is 
satisfied).  
Consider the following example: There is a society composed of two groups, type 1 and type 2. Each 
group is composed of an equal number of identical members; choose units so that this number is one. 
There are two goods of concern, aggregate consumption goods and health. Consumption is measured in 
monetary units and health in non-monetary units; e.g., dollars and life years (LY), respectively. 
Individuals in group j are willing to trade consumption for health at a constant rate of vj ($/LY) with v2 > 
v1 (the difference in rates of substitution might arise because type 2 individuals are wealthier than type 
1). There are two policies. Each imposes a cost of c dollars of consumption on every person. Policy A 
provides h1 LY to type 1 individuals and no benefits to type 2; Policy B provides h2 LY to type 2 
individuals and no benefits to type 1. Policy A provides more health than policy B: h1 > h2. 
The monetary value of the benefit of policy A to type 1 individuals is v1 h1 and the monetary value of the 
benefit of policy B to type 2 individuals is v2 h2 (calculations are summarized in Table 1). Hence the social 
net monetary value of policy A is v1 h1 – 2 c and that of policy B is v2 h2 – 2 c. Although policy A provides 






 , i.e., if the 
proportional difference in the rate at which health is valued by the two groups exceeds the proportional 
difference in the quantity of health provided by the two policies. Assume this condition is satisfied. 
The evaluation of these policies is illustrated in Figure 1. The horizontal axis measures effects on Type 1 
individuals and the vertical axis measures effects on Type 2 individuals. The origin is at the status quo 
(SQ). Every point in the quadrant above and to the right of the origin (including the two axes) 
corresponds to a Pareto improvement on the status quo: at least one type is better off and neither type 
is worse off. The set of potential Pareto improvements includes all the points above and to the right of 
 
6 Brekke (1997) illustrates this point with a simple example and suggests it can be quantitatively 
significant for environmental policy. See Drèze (1998), Johansson (1998), Brekke (1998) and Ellerman 





the dashed line with slope – 1; this line describes the allocation of benefits and harms to the two groups 
that can be achieved from the status quo by lump-sum transfers of money from one group to the other. 
M(A) depicts the result of policy A: compared with the status quo, Type 1 individuals’ net gain is valued 
as v1 h1 – c dollars and Type 2 individuals’ net loss as c dollars. Similarly, M(B) corresponds to policy B: 
Type 1 individuals’ net loss is c dollars and Type 2 individuals’ net gain is valued as v2 h2 – c dollars. In the 
figure, M(B) is above and to the right of the dashed line; it is a potential Pareto improvement on the 
status quo and the social net monetary benefits are positive. In contrast, M(A) is below and to the left of 
the dashed line; its social net monetary benefits are negative. This situation will arise when costs are 
between the monetary values of the two policies, v2 h2 > 2 c > v1 h1 .  
Alternatively, BCA can be conducted using health units (LY) as the numéraire. As shown in Table 2, the 
benefits of policy A are h1 LY to Type 1 and 0 LY to Type 2; the benefits of policy B are h2 LY to Type 2 and 
0 LY to Type 1. The value of the costs in health units is c / vj for Type j. The net benefit of policy A to Type 
1 individuals is valued as h1 – c / v1 LY and that to Type 2 individuals as – c / v2 LY. The net benefit of a 
policy to a group measured in health units (shown in Table 2) is simply the net benefit measured in 
monetary units (shown in Table 1) divided by the rate at which group members are willing to trade 
consumption for health (vj). The social net health benefit of a policy is the sum of the net health benefits 
across the two groups. 
 The social net health benefit of policy A is larger than that of policy B. Changing the numéraire used for 
the analysis (from monetary to health units) has changed the policy that has greater social net benefit 
(from B to A). To clarify, consider Figure 2, which adds the evaluation using health units to Figure 1. It is 
convenient for the exposition to choose units for consumption and health so that v2 > 1 > v1. Then the 
benefits and costs to Type 1 individuals (plotted along the horizontal axis) are larger in absolute value 
when measured in LY than in dollars, and the benefits and costs to Type 2 individuals (plotted along the 
vertical axis) are smaller in absolute value when measured in LY than in dollars. Policy A provides net 
benefits to Type 1 and net costs to Type 2 individuals. Using health as the numeraire increases the 
magnitude of the benefits to Type 1 and decreases the magnitude of the costs to Type 2 individuals, 
shifting the outcome upward and to the right from M(A) to H(A). Conversely, policy B provides net costs 
to Type 1 and net benefits to Type 2 individuals. Changing from monetary to health units increases the 
cost to Type 1 individuals and decreases the benefits to Type 2 individuals, shifting the outcome 
downward and to the left from M(B) to H(B). The change of numéraire has a large enough effect to 





positive net benefit (H(A) is above and to the right of the dashed line) and policy B has negative net 
benefit (H(B) is below and to the left of the dashed line), opposite the case using monetary units. 
The example illustrates how the evaluation of efficiency depends on the units in which benefits and 
costs are measured. In general, the shape of a wellbeing possibility frontier can change when one 
numéraire is substituted for another. Assuming there are no feasible points that are Pareto superior to 
the status quo or to either policy, then the efficient frontier using monetary values includes M(A), SQ, 
and M(B) but the efficient frontier using health values is flatter and includes H(A), SQ, and H(B). The 
notion that efficiency and distribution can be cleanly separated is an oversimplification; the efficiency of 
a policy as evaluated using BCA can depend on the choice of numéraire. 
Introducing weights to BCA can reproduce the effect of changing the numéraire (at least for small 
changes in individuals’ outcomes). Because the net health benefit of a policy to a group equals the net 
monetary benefit divided by the monetary value per health unit, summing net health benefits across 
groups is equivalent to summing net monetary benefits weighted by the reciprocal of the monetary 
value per health unit for each group. In symbols, ∑𝑁𝐻𝐵𝑗 = ∑𝑤𝑗𝑁𝑀𝐵𝑗, where wj = 1/vj, NMBj and NHBj 
are the net monetary benefit and net health benefit to group j, respectively, and the summations are 
over the groups indexed by j.7  
Note that cost-effectiveness analysis (CEA) as widely used in evaluating health and medical interventions 
combines two numéraires: health effects are evaluated in health units such as quality-adjusted life years 
(QALYs) while resource costs are evaluated using monetary units (Neumann et al. 2016). The effect is to 
aggregate health and other consequences using different standards for interpersonal comparison. When 
the units are dollars and QALYs, health consequences are aggregated so that a QALY counts the same, 
regardless of which individual receives it, and costs are aggregated so that a dollar counts the same, 
regardless of which individual pays it. Policies are summarized by the incremental cost-effectiveness 
ratio (ICER), defined as the incremental cost divided by the incremental health effect, where the 
increments are the differences between the consequences of the policy and of some comparator (such 
as the status quo or a specified alternative policy). Its units are dollars per QALY. If both incremental 
costs and incremental health effects are positive, then policies with a smaller ICER are more efficient 
(they cost less per unit health gain). Determining whether a policy is socially preferred to its comparator 
 
7 The units may differ. If the distributional weights wj are dimensionless, then the units of weighted net 





requires comparing the ICER with a threshold cost-effectiveness ratio that characterizes social 
preferences for health relative to other goods and is determined outside the CEA.8 Stinnett and Mullahy 
(1998) propose a form of BCA using QALYs as numéraire and a threshold cost-effectiveness ratio to 
convert monetary amounts to QALYs (constant across individuals). Canning (2013) derives a form of BCA 
using healthy life years lived at the individual’s current income as numéraire that is consistent with CEA 
and with a utilitarian social welfare function.  
What is the most appropriate numéraire? To the extent one relies on the Kaldor-Hicks potential 
compensation test as a justification for BCA, monetary values seem preferable to health values or other 
alternatives. Although money transfers are not cost free, it is feasible to transfer money between 
groups; in contrast, it is more difficult or impossible to transfer health. Moreover, the equivalence 
between weighted BCA and BCA using an alternative numéraire implies that the results of using an 
alternative numéraire can be easily replicated by introducing an appropriate set of weights. If BCA is 
defined as maximizing a specified social welfare function (Drèze and Stern 1987) then the social welfare 
function determines the weights. In this case, the weights depend on the numéraire and the choice of 
numéraire does not affect the policy ranking. 
Weighted BCA is not often used in practice, presumably because of the difficulty in choosing a set of 
weights to substitute for the possibly implicit choice of equal weights. As discussed at the end of the 
following section, the choice of distributional weights requires a normative judgment; the weights 
cannot be measured even in principle.9 When weights are used, they tend to be based on current 
income as opposed to health status, race or ethnicity, social disadvantages, past conditions, or other 
factors. One example is the British government’s recommendation to conduct weighted BCA as a 
supplement to equal-weight BCA using weights that are inversely proportional to income raised to the 
1.3 power (HM Treasury 2018). This formula is based on an estimate of how marginal utility varies with 
income, using self-reported wellbeing as a measure of utility.  
 
8 Policy evaluation also requires knowing the signs of both incremental costs and health effects. If both 
are less than zero, then the policy is more efficient than the comparator if the ICER is larger than the 
threshold (because the cost saving is large compared with the health loss). If the ICER is less than zero, 
its absolute value is irrelevant. If incremental costs are negative and incremental health effects are 
positive, the policy is better than the comparator and if incremental costs are positive and incremental 
health effects are negative, the policy is worse than the comparator. 
9 One could measure public judgments about appropriate distributional weights with a survey, but 






3. Social welfare functions 
An alternative to BCA is to evaluate policies using a social welfare function (SWF). A SWF is a function of 
individuals’ utilities (that measure wellbeing) that can incorporate concerns for both efficiency and 
equity. A simple example is the utilitarian SWF, 𝑊𝑈 = ∑𝑢𝑖, where uj is the utility of individual i and the 
summation is over all individuals in the society. An individual’s utility is often modeled as depending only 
on wealth (or consumption) but can depend on health and many other factors. It is often interpreted as 
measuring total lifetime wellbeing.10 
The use of an SWF requires that measures of changes and in some cases levels of utilities be 
interpersonally comparable. For the utilitarian SWF, if a policy increases utility of individual 1 by 1 and 
decreases utility of individual 2 by 2 < 1, calculated social welfare WU will increase. Interpreting this 
change as an improvement requires that 2 < 1 implies that the reduction in individual 2’s wellbeing is 
smaller than the increase in individual 1’s wellbeing. If there is no objective method for comparing 
changes in wellbeing between individuals, SWFs require a subjective (judgmental) method. This 
judgment is parallel to the one required to interpret a positive value of social net benefit (a potential 
Pareto improvement) as a social improvement when using BCA. 
Under the usual assumption that utility is a concave function of income (diminishing marginal utility), 
the utilitarian SWF is sensitive to distribution of income; an increase in income contributes more to 
social utility if it goes to someone with lower income. It is not sensitive to how wellbeing is distributed; 
increasing one person’s utility by  and decreasing another person’s utility by  produces no change in 
WU.  
The continuous-prioritarian (“prioritarian” for short) SWF sums transformed individual utilities, 𝑊𝑃 =
∑𝑔(𝑢𝑖) , where g(u) is a continuous, increasing, concave function of u (i.e., the slope is positive and 
decreases as u increases). Like the utilitarian SWF, the prioritarian SWF is an increasing function of each 
individual’s utility; any Pareto improvement increases social welfare. Unlike the utilitarian SWF, social 
welfare is sensitive to the levels of utility of the persons affected.11 The prioritarian SWF exhibits 
inequality aversion: any transfer of utility from someone with higher utility to someone with lower 
 
10 Adler (2019) provides a comprehensive and accessible introduction to SWFs. 
11 Hence the prioritarian SWF requires interpersonal comparability of levels as well as changes in utility. 





utility increases WP; holding total utility in a society constant, the prioritarian SWF is maximized when 
utility is distributed equally.  
The degree of inequality aversion of a prioritarian SWF is characterized by the curvature of the 
transformation function g. If g is linear, the prioritarian SWF is the utilitarian SWF and exhibits no 
inequality aversion. At the opposite extreme, the prioritarian SWF corresponds to the leximin SWF, 
which evaluates social welfare by the utility of the individual with the smallest utility, if these are equal 
by the utility of the individual with the second smallest utility, and so on.  
Applying a prioritarian SWF when policy outcomes are uncertain raises an interesting complexity: the 
evaluation can depend on whether the policy is evaluated ex ante or ex post. To illustrate, let the utility 
of individual i depend on the state of nature s. The state of nature is unknown but the probabilities of all 
states are known; the probability of state sk equals pk. The ex ante prioritarian SWF is the sum over 
individuals of each person’s expected utility, 𝑊𝐸𝐴𝑃 = ∑ 𝑔[∑ 𝑝𝑘𝑢𝑖(𝑠𝑘)𝑘 ]𝑖 . The ex post prioritarian SWF is 
the expected value of the social welfare in each state of nature, 𝑊𝐸𝑃𝑃 = ∑ 𝑝𝑘 𝑘 {∑ 𝑔[𝑢𝑖(𝑠𝑘)]𝑖 }. The two 
evaluations can differ because the ex ante prioritarian SWF gives priority to individuals with lower 
expected utility (bad lotteries) while the ex post prioritarian SWF gives priority to individuals with lower 
utility in more probable states (likely bad outcomes). This difference is analogous to the difference 
between concern for equality of opportunity (equal lotteries) and for equality of outcome.  
The ex ante and ex post prioritarian SWFs each violate a property that seems desirable for social 
evaluation, but they violate different properties: the Pareto principle or statewise dominance. The 
Pareto principle requires that if every individual weakly prefers the lottery over outcomes associated 
with one policy to the lottery associated with another policy, social welfare should be at least as great 
for the first policy. Statewise dominance requires that if the social evaluation of the outcome of one 
policy is at least as good as the evaluation of the outcome of another policy in every state of nature, 
social welfare should be at least as great for the first policy.12 
The ex post prioritarian SWF satisfies statewise dominance but violates the Pareto principle: even if 
everyone prefers the lottery associated with one policy to the lottery associated with another, the 
second lottery may be evaluated as superior by the ex post prioritarian SWF. This can happen because 
 
12 If the conditions in the text are satisfied, the Pareto principle requires that if one individual’s 
preference is strict, social welfare is strictly greater; statewise dominance requires that if the evaluation 





the ex post prioritarian SWF effectively adds an extra degree of risk aversion to each individual’s 
evaluation. Individual i evaluates her lottery by its expected utility, ∑ 𝑝𝑘𝑢𝑖(𝑠𝑘)𝑘 , but the ex post 
prioritarian SWF evaluates her lottery by the expected value of transformed utility, ∑ 𝑝𝑘𝑔[𝑢𝑖(𝑠𝑘)]𝑘 . 
Individual i’s risk aversion with respect to outcomes is incorporated in the function ui. The SWF adds an 
extra degree of risk aversion by transforming utility through the concave function g(u), i.e., it is risk 
averse with respect to the individual’s utility. Modifying the outcomes of individual i’s lottery in a way 
that increases the expected utility but also increases the spread of the utilities across states might be 
preferred by the individual but at the same time decrease the evaluated social welfare. 
In contrast, the ex ante prioritarian SWF satisfies the Pareto principle but violates statewise dominance. 
To illustrate, consider a problem inspired by Broome (1978). The N residents of a town wish to build a 
bridge across the river that divides them. Construction is dangerous and they know that one among 
them will be killed in an accident. Each person faces an identical risk of dying, 1/N, and each is willing to 
accept that risk in order to build the bridge. However, each person prefers the outcome with no bridge 
and no deaths to the outcome of having the bridge at the cost of the death of one of their fellow 
residents.13 Ex ante, building the bridge is a Pareto improvement. But for every possible state of nature 
(i.e., for each individual who would die), the outcome under the status quo is better than the outcome 
of building the bridge. 
Note that BCA, like the ex ante prioritarian SWF, satisfies the Pareto principle but can violate statewise 
dominance. In the bridge-building example, assume the individuals are identical. Their preferences 
concerning wealth and the risk of dying during bridge construction are summarized by the indifference 
curve illustrated in Figure 3.14 Under the status quo, each individual is at point A, with mortality risk 0. 
To accept a mortality risk of 1/N, each would require compensation of v dollars. Let b denote the 
monetary value to each individual of having the bridge (conditional on survival). Under BCA, the cost of 
the project is N v and the benefit is (N – 1) b.15 Since each individual ex ante prefers building the bridge, 
(N – 1) b exceeds v and social benefits exceed social costs. But once it is known which individual would 
die, the compensation that person would require to compensate for his risk is larger than N v; it may 
 
13 One might argue these preferences are inconsistent. Nevertheless, they are consistent with evaluation 
using BCA. 
14 Under standard and reasonable conditions, indifference curves between survival probability and 
wealth are downward sloping and convex as illustrated in Figure 3 (Hammitt and Treich 2007). 





exceed (N – 1) b and may be infinite (i.e., the indifference curve may not intersect the left axis, where 
mortality risk is 1). Ex ante, policy winners can compensate losers (since everyone is identical, there are 
no policy losers). But ex post, for each possible state of nature, policy winners (survivors) may not be 
able to compensate the sole policy loser (the individual who will die during construction).16  
The evaluation of a policy using a SWF can be mimicked (for small changes) using weighted BCA. For 
simplicity, assume that individuals’ utility depends only on their wealth. Then for the utilitarian SWF, 
distributional weights are proportional to each individual’s marginal utility of wealth. To illustrate, let vi 
be the monetary value to individual i of the consequences of some policy. Under the status quo her 
utility is ui(wi) where wi is her wealth and with the policy her utility is ui(wi + vi). Her change in utility due 
to the policy ui = ui(wi + vi) – ui(wi) ≈ vi ui’(wi), where the prime denotes first derivative. The utilitarian 
SWF compares the total utility in the population with the policy to the total utility without, which is 
equivalent to the sum of individuals’ changes in utility. Let WU(A) and WU(S) denote utilitarian social 
welfare under the policy and the status quo, respectively. Then the change in social welfare 𝑊𝑈(𝐴) −
𝑊𝑈(𝑆) = ∑ 𝑢𝑖(𝑤𝑖 + 𝑣𝑖) −𝑖 ∑ 𝑢𝑖(𝑤𝑖) = ∑ [𝑢𝑖(𝑤𝑖 + 𝑣𝑖) − 𝑢𝑖(𝑤𝑖)]𝑖 = ∑ ∆𝑢𝑖𝑖 ≈ ∑ 𝑢𝑖′𝑣𝑖𝑖𝑖 . 
Hence the change in utilitarian social welfare can be approximated by the weighted sum of monetary 
values, with weights equal to the marginal utilities of wealth. For the prioritarian SWF, the appropriate 
weights are the product of the utilitarian weight ui’ and a term that depends on individuals’ utilities and 
the transformation function, g’(ui). Although the values may be approximately equal, the units are 
different: Weighted BCA measures effects in monetary units and SWFs measure them in units of social 
wellbeing. 
This derivation emphasizes that the choice of distributional weights for weighted BCA is parallel to the 
choice of how to compare changes in individuals’ utility. Measuring individuals’ willingness to pay for 
changes in health, environmental quality, or other goods provides information about the slopes of their 
indifference curves over wealth and these goods, but provides no information about the change in utility 
that corresponds to a change in wealth (equivalently, no information about the difference in utility 
between two indifference curves). Individual utility functions are unique up to a positive monotone 
 
16 Ulph (1982) provides a thoughtful comparison of the ex ante and ex post perspectives for this problem 
and Heinzerling (2000) offers a provocative critique of the ex ante perspective applied to mortality risk. 
A series of papers beginning with Starr (1973) examine the ex ante and ex post efficiency of competitive 





transformation; if ui(w) represents individual i’s utility as a function of wealth, then so does hi[ui(w)], 
where hi is an increasing function. Choosing a different function hi for an individual changes her total 
utility, her marginal utility of wealth, and her incremental utility for a policy change. Nozick (1974) 
illustrates the problem of comparing changes in utility interpersonally by the inability to rule out the 
existence of a “utility monster,” an individual who gains so much utility from even a tiny increment of 
resources that maximizing utility in a society requires transferring nearly all the resources to the 
monster (the prioritarian SWF can yield the same result).  
4. Quantifying distributions 
If policy evaluation is to be sensitive to the distribution of effects in the population, the distribution 
must be quantified. This raises practical and even theoretical challenges that are often elided in practice.  
The distribution of concern is evidently the distribution of net benefits. Knowing only the population 
distributions of benefits and of costs is insufficient; if the benefits and costs are each concentrated on a 
small subpopulation, the equity of the situation may depend on whether it is the same subpopulation. If 
it is, then knowing that total benefits exceed total costs suggests net benefits are positive for most 
members of the subpopulation and small for people outside the subpopulation; in this case, the policy is 
likely to be socially desirable. If the benefits are concentrated on one subpopulation and the costs on 
another, then judgments about equity depend on knowing the relevant characteristics of the 
subpopulations. Factors that may affect the merits of the distributions include wealth or income, 
previous circumstances (e.g., disadvantages in childhood), health, racial or ethnic status, personal 
responsibility for circumstances, and others. 
It many cases, it may difficult or even impossible to determine the distribution of benefits or costs, and 
hence of net benefits, in a population. For market goods and services, the total benefits or costs are 
often estimated by changes in consumer and producer surplus, which depend on shifts in demand or 
supply functions. But these concepts provide no information about distribution; e.g., market demand 
may be composed of many consumers each buying a small quantity or fewer consumers each buying a 
large quantity. The social costs of policies that alter production costs (e.g., product safety standards, 
environmental regulations) may be calculated from product-market data, but the incidence of these 
costs on consumers, on different firms in a supply chain, and on the firms’ workers and owners may be 





In some cases, the distribution of effects may be unknowable. Mortality and nonfatal health effects of 
exposure to a wide range of environmental hazards, consumer products, foods, medicines, and other 
agents can be estimated using data from epidemiological studies or randomized controlled trials. These 
sources can be used to estimate the frequency distribution of age at death (or age at incidence of a 
disease) conditional on different levels of exposure to the hazard. But they cannot be used to determine 
which individuals died earlier than they otherwise would have because of their exposure. Data on age at 
death cannot even determine how many people died earlier than they otherwise would have because of 
their exposure. The problem is that, while the marginal distributions of age at death are statistically 
identified, the joint distribution of an individual’s two potential ages of death (conditional on exposure 
and non-exposure) is not. It is possible that exposure advances the time of death for all exposed 
individuals or that it advances the time of death for only a fraction of exposed individuals (by a larger 
amount). Life expectancy if exposed or unexposed is determined by the marginal distributions of age at 
death, and so the difference in life expectancy (or the expected gain in life years by eliminating the 
hazard) is statistically identified and can be estimated.17  
5. Conclusion 
Benefit-cost analysis that sums the monetary values of benefits and harms in a population does not 
account for concerns about the distribution of policy effects. The common description of BCA as 
measuring efficiency (the size of the social pie) as a concept that is distinct from distribution (the 
allocation of the pie) is misleading. In general, the size of the social pie cannot be measured without 
choosing some method for comparing the contributions of different goods and services to it. When 
individuals have different rates of substitution between them, the choice of which commodity to use as 
numéraire can affect the ranking of policies by their calculated efficiency. 
Equal-weight BCA uses monetary values as the standard for comparison, which implies that if it 
measures gains in social wellbeing, then a gain of a dollar produces the same increase in social wellbeing 
regardless of who receives it. This implication violates two common judgments about individual 
preferences and a good society: first, that the marginal utility of wealth decreases as wealth increases, 
and second, that too much wealth inequality leads to a less-good society. Alternative evaluation 
methods that can better accommodate these concerns include use of an alternative numéraire (such as 
health units), weighted BCA, and social welfare functions (SWF). Each of these alternatives is used in 
 





practice, albeit to a limited extent. Cost-effectiveness analysis in health policy uses health units as the 
numéraire for evaluating health effects (and monetary units to evaluate resource costs); in some cases, 
results are presented as net health benefits (Stinnett and Mullahy 1998). Weighted BCA is 
recommended (as a supplement to equal-weight BCA) in the British government’s guidance for policy 
evaluation (HM Treasury 2018) and described as a method that “can be possibly used” in the European 
Union guidance (European Commission 2015, Annex V). The World Bank adopted the use of welfare 
weights in its internal guidance in 1980, but apparently used such weights only rarely and on an 
experimental basis (Drèze 1998, Florio 2014). SWFs are used in evaluating tax policies and in choosing 
discount rates for policies with long time horizons, such as for climate change, using Ramsey discounting 
(Arrow et al. 2014).  
BCA has the advantage that it is practical: monetary values of many goods and services can be estimated 
from market data and methods for estimating values of non-market goods are well-developed. BCA 
using an alternative numéraire may be almost as practical, since the value of goods and services to an 
individual in an alternative numéraire is equal to the monetary value in monetary units divided by her 
rate of substitution of wealth for the alternative numéraire. It seems feasible to estimate at least typical 
rates of substitution for subpopulations defined by income and other relevant characteristics. In 
contrast, SWFs require explicit judgments about how to measure utility differences and perhaps levels in 
a way that is interpersonally comparable; since there is no objective way to do so, this requires 
subjective judgment and/or social agreement. In addition, SWFs require normative judgment about 
which SWF to employ (e.g., utilitarian or prioritarian) and perhaps additional details (such as the 
curvature of the utility-transformation function g). Weighted BCA can be used to mimic either the use of 
an alternative numéraire or a specific SWF; alternatively, if distributional weights are chosen on some 
other basis, it can be used directly. At least for small changes in outcomes, all four approaches (equal-
weight BCA, equal-weight BCA using an alternative numéraire, weighted BCA, SWF) can produce the 
same policy ranking. Moreover, all four approaches depend on normative choices that are 
fundamentally equivalent judgments about how to evaluate improvements to some people and harms 
to others. It may be useful to present results showing the distribution of net benefits across 
subpopulations so that readers who wish to can apply their own distributional weights (Nyborg 2012). 
Concerns about distributional equity influence BCA as practiced. It is common to use the same monetary 
value of a good for all individuals, ignoring differences associated with income or other characteristics. 





population. Attempts to use different values based on income or age have met with sharp public and 
political opposition (e.g., when the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency applied a 37 percent smaller 
VSL to individuals older than 65 years as a sensitivity analysis in its evaluation of an air-pollution 
regulation; Robinson 2007, Viscusi 2009). Policy evaluation is sensitive to distributional effects; e.g., the 
executive order that requires BCA of regulations in the U.S. prescribes “agencies should select those 
approaches that maximize net benefits (including potential economic, environmental, public health and 
safety, and other advantages; distributive impacts; and equity)” (Clinton 1993). Policies are often 
designed to set minimum standards for specific dimensions of wellbeing rather than to improve overall 
wellbeing. As examples, occupational and environmental health standards limit the maximum risks to 
which individuals can be exposed and programs to provide food, housing, education, and health care are 
more common than direct income support (Harberger 1978). 
In sum, BCA as conventionally described and practiced does not account for how benefits and costs are 
distributed in a population and may not incorporate social preferences over the distribution of policy 
effects. The beauty of BCA is that it does not require information about how a change in circumstances 
affects individuals’ wellbeing that is interpersonally comparable. But it avoids demand for this 
information by the implicit choice of using monetary values as the numéraire, perhaps without 
adequate recognition that the choice of numéraire is normative and affects the calculated efficiency of 
alternative policies. These limitations can be overcome, but only at the cost of more explicit choices 
about normative assumptions of evaluation methods. BCA as practiced departs from its theoretical basis 
in an attempt to be more consistent with social judgments about distributional equity; BCA might find 
greater acceptance and application if it were modified to incorporate these concerns more directly. 
Acknowledgements 
This paper is based on a keynote address at the Society for Benefit-Cost Analysis: European Conference 
2019. I thank the three anonymous reviewers, associate editor Massimo Florio, Matthew Adler, Kerry 
Krutilla, Emile Quinet, Lisa Robinson, François Salanié, Nicolas Treich, and participants at the conference 
for helpful comments and discussions. I acknowledge funding from the French National Research Agency 








Adler, M.D., Measuring Social Welfare: An Introduction, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2019. 
Adler, M.D., Benefit–cost analysis and distributional weights: an overview, Review of Environmental 
Economics and Policy 10: 264–285, 2016. 
Aldy, J.E., and W.K. Viscusi, Adjusting the value of a statistical life for age and cohort effects, Review of 
Economics and Statistics, 90: 573–581, 2008. 
Arrow, K.J., M.L. Cropper, C. Gollier, B. Groom, G.M. Heal, R.G. Newell, W.D. Nordhaus, R.S. Pindyck, 
W.A. Pizer, P.R. Portney, T. Sterner, R.S.J. Tol, and M.L. Weitzman, Should governments use a 
declining discount rate in project analysis? Review of Environmental Economics and Policy 8: 
145–163, 2014. 
Brekke, K.A., The numéraire matters in cost-benefit analysis, Journal of Public Economics 64: 117-123, 
1997. 
Brekke, K.A., Reply to J. Drèze and P.-O. Johansson, Journal of Public Economics 70: 495-496, 1998. 
Broome, J., Trying to value a life, Journal of Public Economics 9: 91-100, 1978. 
Canning, D., axiomatic foundations for cost-effectiveness analysis, Health Economics 22: 1405–1416, 
2013. 
Clinton, W.J., Regulatory Planning and Review, Executive Order 12866 of September 30, 1993, Federal 
Register 58(190), October 4, 1993. 
Deaton, A., The Great Escape: Health, Wealth, and the Origins of Inequality, Princeton University Press, 
Princeton, 2014. 
Drèze, J., Distribution matters in cost-benefit analysis, Journal of Public Economics 70: 485-488, 1998. 
Drèze, J., and N. Stern, The Theory of Cost-Benefit Analysis, Handbook of Public Economics, Vol. II (A.J. 
Auerbach and M. Feldstein, eds.), pp. 909-989, Elsevier Science Publishers, Amsterdam, 1987. 
Ellerman, D., Numeraire illusion: the final demise of the Kaldor–Hicks principle, Theoretical Foundations 






Ellerman, D., On a fallacy in the Kaldor–Hicks efficiency–equity analysis, Constitutional Political Economy 
25: 125-136, 2014. 
European Commission, Directorate-General for Regional and Urban policy, Guide to Cost-Benefit 
Analysis of Investment Projects: Economic appraisal tool for Cohesion Policy 2014-2020, 
European Union, 2015. 
Fleurbaey, M., and R. Abi-Rafeh, The use of distributional weights in benefit–cost analysis: insights from 
welfare economics, Review of Environmental Economics and Policy 10: 286-307, 2016. 
Florio, M., Applied Welfare Economics Cost-Benefit Analysis of Projects and Policies, Routledge, Milton 
Park, Abingdon, Oxon, 2014. 
Hammitt, J.K., and N. Treich, Statistical vs. identified lives in benefit-cost analysis, Journal of Risk and 
Uncertainty 35: 45-66, 2007. 
Hammitt, J.K., P. Morfeld, J.T. Tuomisto, and T.C. Erren, Premature deaths and statistical lives: 
identification, quantification, and valuation of mortality risks, Risk Analysis 40: 674-695, 2020. 
Hammond, P., Ex ante and ex post welfare optimality under uncertainty, Economica 48: 235-50, 1981. 
Harris, R., and N. Olewiler, The welfare economics of ex post optimality, Economica 46: 137-47, 1979. 
Harberger, A.C., On the use of distributional weights in social cost-benefit analysis, Journal of Political 
Economy 86: S87-S120, 1978. 
Harberger, A.C., On the use of distributional weights in social cost-benefit analysis: reply to Layard and 
Squire, Journal of Political Economy 88: 1050-1052, 1980. 
Heinzerling, L. The rights of statistical people, Harvard Environmental Law Review 24: 189-207, 2000. 
HM Treasury, The Green Book: Central Government Guidance on Appraisal and Evaluation, London, 
2018. 
Hylland, A. and R. Zeckhauser, Distributional objectives should affect taxes but not program choice or 
design, Scandinavian Journal of Economics 81: 264-284, 1979. 
Johansson, P.-O., Does the choice of numéraire matter in cost-benefit analysis? Journal of Public 





Kaplow, L. The optimal supply of public goods and the distortionary cost of taxation, National Tax 
Journal 49: 513–33, 1996. 
Kaplow, L., On the (ir)relevance of distribution and labor supply distortion to government policy, Journal 
of Economic Perspectives 18: 159–175, 2004. 
Milne, F., and H.M. Shefrin, Ex post efficiency and ex post welfare: some fundamental considerations, 
Economica 55: 63-79, 1988. 
Mishan, E.J., Welfare Economics: An Assessment, North-Holland, Amsterdam, 1969. 
Neumann, P.J., G.D. Sander, L.B. Russell, J.E. Siegel, and, T.G. Ganiats (eds.), Cost-Effectiveness in Health 
and Medicine, 2d ed., Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2016. 
Nozick, R., Anarchy, State, and Utopia, Basic Books, New York, 1974. 
Nyborg, K., The Ethics and Politics of Environmental Cost-Benefit Analysis, Routledge, Milton Park, 
Abingdon, Oxon, 2012. 
OMB, Circular A-4: Regulatory Analysis, U.S. Office of Management and Budget, Washington, D.C., 
September 17, 2003. 
Piketty, T. Capital in the 21st Century (Le Capital au XXIe siècle), Éditions du Seuil, Paris, 2013; Harvard 
University Press, Cambridge 2014. 
Posner, R.A., Utilitarianism, economics, and legal theory, Journal of Legal Studies 8: 103-140, 1979. 
Robinson, L.A., How US government agencies value mortality risk reductions, Review of Environmental 
Economics and Policy 1: 283–299, 2007. 
Robinson, L.A., J.K. Hammitt, and R.J. Zeckhauser, Attention to distribution in U.S. regulatory analyses, 
Review of Environmental Economics and Policy 10: 308-328, 2016. 
Starr, R., Optimal production and allocation under uncertainty, Quarterly Journal of Economics 87: 81-
95, 1973. 
Stinnett, A.A., and J. Mullahy, Net health benefits: a new framework for the analysis of uncertainty in 





Ulph, A. The role of ex ante and ex post decisions in the valuation of life, Journal of Public Economics 18: 
265-276, 1982. 
Viscusi, W.K., The devaluation of life, Regulation and Governance 3: 103–127, 2009. 
Weisbrod, B., Income redistribution effects and benefit-cost analysis, Problems in Public Expenditure 
Analysis (S.B. Chase, ed.), pp. 177-209, Brookings Institution, Washington, D.C., 1968. 
Zerbe, R.O. Jr., T.B. Davis, N. Garland, and T. Scott, Conclusion: principles and standards for benefit–cost 
analysis, Principles and Standards for Benefit–Cost Analysis (S. Farrow and R.O. Zerbe, Jr., eds.), 






Table 1. Equal-weight BCA using monetary values (dollars) 
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Note: Numerals 1 and 2 denote groups that receive benefits or pay costs; Benefit and Cost are 




Table 2. Alternative BCA using health units (LY) as numéraire 







































Note: Numerals 1 and 2 denote groups that receive benefits or pay costs; HB = benefit in health units, 
HC = cost in health units, NHB = net health benefits. 
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Figure 1. Distribution and total net monetary benefits 
of policies A and B to groups 1 and 2
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Figure 2. Distribution and total net monetary benefits 
and net health benefits of policies A and B
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Figure 3. Total ex ante valuation N v of mortality risk 1/N 
to a population of N identical individuals
N v
